Abstract. A secret error-correcting coding (SECC) scheme is one that provides both data secrecy and data reliability in one process to combat with problems in an insecure and unreliable channel. In an SECC scheme, only the authorized user havingsecretly held information can correct channel errors systematically. Two SECC schemes are proposed in this paper. The first is a block encryption using Preparata based nonlinear codes; the second one is based on block chaining technique. Along with each schemes can be secure.
Introduction
The demand for reliable, secure and efficient digital data transmission and storage system has been accelerated by the emergence of large-scale and high speed communication networks. In 1948, Shannon demonstrated that errors induced by a noisy channel or storage medium can be reduced to any desirable level by proper encoding of the information [Shannon 481 . Since Shannon's work, a great deal of developments have contributed toward achieving data reliability and the use of coding for error control has become an integral part in t h e design of modern communication systems and digital computers.
Information transmitted through communication channel or stored in storage system is particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping and tampering.
Although information can be protected by several ways (e.g., physical control --data are stored in physically secure place; or computer system control -the operating system provides access control mechanisms to check user's authentication), data encryption is the most cost-effective way to provide data secrecy [Diffie 7 6 , Wood 81, Denning 821.
A s computer communications are expanding to many applications, assurance of both data reliability and data secrecy becomes an important issue. To achieve this purpose, conventionally the first step is to encipher a plaintext (M) into a ciphertext and the second step is to encode the ciphertext into a codeword (C). To recover the plaintext (hl), the receiver decodes the received word (C' = C + noise) first and then deciphers the ciphertext (see 
Joint Encryption and Error Correction ( J E E C ) Scheme
In his public-key cryptosystem, McEliece applied error-correcting capability of Goppa codes to provide data secrecy [McEliece 781. His idea is to introduce a random error vector to each encoded plaintext before transmission. The
Hamming weight ( t ' ) of the error vector is equal to the number ( t ) of errors the code cAn correct. Therefore, the receiver can remove the error vector and recover the plaintext by applying the decoding of the code.
If t f < t , then up t o t -t f errors may occur in the channel and these errors can be corrected by the receiver. Thus, the system provides both data secrecy and data reliability simultaneously. Since the system becomes less secure if t ' is small but provides less error correcting capability if t f is large, there is a trade-off between data secrecy and data reliability. This approach, t o obtain both data secrecy and data reliability while providing a trade-off between them, is called the Joint Encryption and Error Correction (JEEC) scheme [Rao 851.
Definition 1. The J E E C Scheme
A scheme that combines data encryption with data encoding into one process while providing a trade-off between data secrecy and data reliability is called a JEEC scheme.
Secret Error-Correcting Codes (SECC)
Conventional approach to obtain both data reliability and data secrecy has the disadvantage of inefficiency in the implementation because data encoding and data enciphering are implemented as two different steps. JEEC scheme combines both transformations into one process while providing only a trade-off between data reliability and d a t a secrecy. Large distance and also large block length codes are required in JEEC to combat with problems in an insecure and unreliable channel. However, such codes have low information rates and a relatively high amount of decryption overhead. Therefore, they may not be cost-effective.
This leads us to introduce the SECC scheme which may use simple algebraic codes (e.g., d -5 6 ) and also provides both data reliability and data security in one process. The SECC scheme can be defined as follows (see Figure 2) .
Definition 2. T h e SECC Scheme
A scheme that combines data encryption with data encoding into one process to obtain both data secrecy and data reliability, while retaining the full error correction capability of the introduced code for possible channel errors, is called an SECC scheme. Also in an SECC scheme, the cryptanalyst is unable to correct channel errors systematically. By that we mean it is computationally infeasible for the cryptanalyst to correct channel errors without decoding keys. Finally, we propme an SECC scheme using nonlinear codes and investigate its security level. [Preparata 681 Preparata has constructed a class of nonlinear double error-correcting (2" -1, 2" -2m ) codes, for each even m 2 4 , with some interesting features.
Inrmdu

Preparata Nonlinear Codes
They contain twice as many codewords as the double error-correcting BCH codes of the same length and they are optimal. Moreover, their decoding can be based on the calculation of syndrome-like quantities and thus the complexity is comparable to the corresponding BCH codes. The encoding and decoding are given here without proof. However, they can be found in [Preparata 681 .
Assume that all polynomials discussed here belong to the algebra of polynomials modulo (zZm-'-' + 1) over GF(?). Let B = { m ( z ) } be a single-errorcorrecting BCH code generated by a primitive polynomial gl(z) of degree m-1 that has a primitive element Q as its root. Let C = {~( z ) } be the BCH code whose generator polynomial has roots a, a3, and 1. The polynomial u ( 2 ) will denote (z*'"-'-~ + I)/(Z+I). Consider a linear code c, given by the vectors of the form
, m ( z ) + ( m (~) + i ) u ( z ) + u ( z ) ] , where i E G F ( 2 ) .
C , can be shown t o be a (zn -1, ~" ' -3 m + I ) linear code of minimum distance 6. For decoding, assume that the vector w was sent and that the vector is received. Given the following definitions
...,( 4, 11
the syndrome S = (uQ ul, u, d ) of r can be computed in the following manner.
where q ( z ) = a z p is the monomial in the codeword. We have given a very brief introduction to Preparata nonlinear codes which can only correct double errors. In this section, we review a code construction technique to construct nonlinear codes that can correct more than two errors.
Let Ki be an Here, we suggest the use of Preparata codes as base codes to construct new nonlinear codes, or we assume that either K, or K, or both are nonlinear codes constructed from Preparata codes. The decoding of the newly developed code is rather straightforward and is omitted here.
Encryption and Decryption of SECC Scheme Using Nonlinear Codes
The SECC scheme using nonlinear codes is a block encryption and error correction combined into one that also preserves the full error correction capability of the code for possible channel errors. Each block is enciphered and deciphered independently under this scheme.
Encryption
Let E , . denote the encoding of a nonlinear code that encodes a k-bit information into an n-bit codeword. Let 9 be an invertible function that transforms a k-bit block into a k-bit block in either a linear or nonlinear manner. The matrix P is a random permutation matrix of size n . A k-bit plaintext block ( M ) is enciphered into an n-bit ciphertext ( C ) by the following equation
The cryptographic parameters that are secretly held in the system are 9 , P and EK.. Since ciphertext-only attacks are much weaker attacks than knownplaintext or chosen-plaintext attacks, constructing a cryptosystem which can withstand ciphertext-only attacks is considered to be much easier than constructing a cryptosystem which can withstand either known-plaintext or chosenplaintext attacks. In the proposed scheme, we assume that the function rIr can withstand ciphertext-only attacks and may be broken by a known-plaintext attack. Hence the security of the scheme should depend on the strength of the combination of functions 9, E k and P and not on the strength of either or Ek or P alone. This also illustrates the difference between SECC and the conventional approach to provide both data secrecy and data reliability.
Decrypt ion
Let D , . be the decoding of the nonlinear code and Ei be a correctable error vector which occurs due to channel noise when the i-th ciphertext block is transmitted. The deciphering procedure is given below.
(1) Remove the permutation matrix P (P' is the transpose matrix of P).
( C +Ei )-Pr = E, .(@(M))+Ei .Pr.
(2) Decoding.
D,.(E,.(@(iW))+EiP') = rIr(M).
(3) Recover the plaintext kf.
M = *-'(*(A4)).
Notice t h a t the error-correcting capability of the code is fully preserved to correct channel errors (Ei 's) a s a property required in an SECC scheme. Since t h e decoding of Preparata codes highly depends on the structure of the codeword, cryptanalyst cannot correct channel errom without knowing the matrix P. This is another property required in an SECC scheme.
Security of SECC Scheme Using Preparata-Based Nonlinear Codes
We have discussed both the enciphering and deciphering of the SECC scheme using Preparata-based nonlinear codes. What remains to be studied is the security of the scheme. For simplicity we investigate the security of the SECC scheme using Preparata codes mainly. The security of the SECC scheme using extended nonlinear codes follows directly. Let E, and D, represent the encoding and decoding of a Preparata code respectively.
As we mentioned earlier that the function 9 can either be a linear or a nonlinear transformation. If the system using a linear function 9 could provide an acceptable level of security (= Po operations), then the system could provide even a better security if \Ir is a nonlinear function.
First, we consider the case that both and P are removed from the original scheme. In the following lemma, we shall show that the simplified scheme can be broken by a known-plaintext attack. For this discussion, we assume that no error occurs in the channel.
Lemma 1.
The encryption scheme
can be broken by a known-plaintext attack in 0 (nZ) bit operations. The number of choices of the primitive polynomials g l ( z ) ' s in Preparata codes of practical lengths is too small for the simplified scheme to be secure.
We may introduce a secret, linear function 3 to scramble the plaintext before encoding. However, the modified system is still insecure under a chosenplaintext attack a s can be shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
T h e encryption scheme C = EP(9(,W)) c a n be broken by a chosen-plaintezt attack in 0 (n2) bit operations. Consequently, f (2) can be derived from the first ?"-l-1 bits and the last T"-l-1 bits of the ciphertext in O ( n 2 ) bit operations. Once f (z) is obtained, g l ( z ) can be derived easily (see Sec. 2.1). Therefore, the security of the system totally depends on the strength of the function 9 which, unfortunately, can be broken by a known-plaintext attacks a s mentioned previously.
Q .E.D.
The simplified scheme in Lemma 2 is insecure because the structure of the code is revealed. Therefore, the cryptanalyst can remove the linear component of the codewords and then break the system. In order to avoid this weakness, a permutation matrix may be introduced to scramble the structure of the code.
However, the following lemma shows that the modified scheme can be broken by a chosen-plaintext attack if the function @ is not introduced to the scheme. 
Q.E.D.
From these lemmas, we see if both the function Q and the permutation matrix P are introduced to the system as a portion of the key, then these attacks cannot break the resulting scheme.
Since there are only a small number of primitive polynominals for a given code length n , the cryptanalyst may try to guess the generator polynomial gl(z) used in the system. However, the work factor to check the correctness of each guess involves a very large amount of overhead to figure out both functions 3 and P. That is a hopeless task.
The SECC scheme using Preparata codes is a block encryption and error correction combined into one that also preserves the full error correction capability of the code for possible channel errors. This is a major distinction from McEliece's scheme, which has no error correcting capability or has only a partial error correcting capability when used as JEEC. While somewhat simpler SECC schemes given by Lemmas 1-3 are shown to be breakable under known-plaintext or chosen-plaintext attacks, the proposed scheme with both functions of * and P appears to be secure. It would be a challenge indeed to find cryptanalytic attacks to break this scheme.
These attacks are performed under the assumption that there is no error occurs in the channel. If there exist channel errors, then it will be much more difficult to perform these attacks against the SECC system. Therefore, the presence of channel errors introduces additional level of data security t o the system as required in an SECC scheme.
There are several types of cryptanalytic attack against algebraic-code cryptosystems discussed in [Rao 87, Struik 871. These attacks are performed based on the linearity of the system. They will not be applicable for this nonlinear coding scheme.
SECC Scheme Using Block Chaining Technique
In this section, we proposed an SECC scheme based on block chaining technique.
In this scheme because each ciphertext is a function of all previous plaintexts, decoding error of one ciphertext will propagate all the way through the last block. This "error propagation" property can be applied to detected any illegal modification to the ciphertext thus provides data integrity [Meyer 821 . Therefore, this scheme can provide not only data reliability and data secrecy but also data integrity in one enciphering. But any decoding error requires the retransmission of all blocks chained together.
Encryption and Decryption of the Proposed Scheme
Rao and Nam have suggested a private-key algebraic code cryptosystem ( RaoNam scheme) using simple linear codes [Rao 871. By simple codes we mean small distance codes,,i.e. d d 5 6 . In this scheme, a k-bit plaintext block Mi is enciphered t o an n-bit ciphertext block Ci by the foilowing equation. Ci =(Mi S G t Z; )P, where S : an arbitrary (k xk) nonsingular matrix, G : an (n , k ) code generator matrix, P : a random (n x n ) permutation matrix, Zi : an error vector of length n randomly selected from a predetermined syndrome-error table.
S, G and P are private keys.
Struik and van Tilburg proposed chosen-plaintext attacks (ST-type attacks)
on Rao-Nam scheme. Their attacks are based on estimating the rows of the encipher matrix G' =SGP by constructing unit vectors from the chosen plaintext or by solving a set of linear equations (Struik 871. They also proposed a modified scheme to withstand these attacks. In their modified scheme, the matrix S in Rao-Nam scheme is replaced by an invertible, nonlinear function f such t h a t M i = f -' ( j (M.,Zi),Zi). In the modified scheme, Mi is enciphered into Ci by the following equation.
These schemes are proposed mainly for providing data secrecy. They are not designed to realize JEEC or SECC and therefore do not provide data reliability.
However, by modifying the way the error vectors ( Z i ' s ) is introduced, a n SECC system can be constructed. Block chaining technique will be applied to facilitate this construction. T h e proposed system is described below and is shown in Figure   3 .
Encryption.
The cryptographic parameters (that are secretly held) for this scheme are f : a n invertible, nonlinear function which transforms a k-bit block to a k-bit block, G : an (n , k ) code generator matrix, g : a k-bit to n-bit block expanding function.
The following symbols are used for this scheme.
Xi : the i -t h output of 1 , ( i = i , z ,... ).
Zi : the i -t h error vector, Z i + l = g ( X , ) . Z I is a correctable error randomly generated by the system. Ei : error vector due to channel noise occurs when the i-th block is transmitted.
Ci' =Ci+E, is the i-th block received at the receiver end. On the other hand, if Xi is fed back to f only (i.e., & is not fed forward t o g ), then the encryption sequence is given as follows.
To attack the scheme, the cryptanalyst may find the equivalent ciphertexts. If f is a nonlinear transformation, then this line of attack may not work.
However, the cryptanalyst could collect k linearly independent codewords to construct a generator matrix (G) which is combinatorially equivalent to G .
Let G = P G for any nonsingular matrix S of rank k. Since the number of nonsingular matrices of rank k is about 0 . 3~2~~~ it is computationally infeasible t o estimate the matrix G used if k is large enough. Thus, the scheme appears secure. But, the cryptanalyst may be able to correct channel errors if construct an SECC system. As a result, the SECC scheme can be very secure if f is an invertible, nonlinear function and g is a nonlinear, one-way function. It will be a challenge to design other lines of attack t o break this scheme.
Conclusion
For the very first time, we introduce the concept of secret error-correcting codes in this paper. An SECC scheme combines data encoding with data encryption into one process and enables the system to correct channel errors aa well as conceal information from unauthorized user simultaneously. The main purpose of this research is t o construct SECC schemes to facilitate a reliable, secure and efficient digital transmission.
We have proposed two SECC schemes to realize this new concept. The first one is a block encryption using Preparata-based nonlinear codes. In this scheme, each block can be enciphered and deciphered independently.
The other SECC scheme is based on block chaining technique. This scheme provides not only data secrecy and data reliability but also data integrity due t o the chaining feature. However, the decryption of each ciphertext cannot be carried out independently. The decoding error in one block requires retransmission of all blocks chained together.
Although we have investigate various cryptanalytical attacks against these schemes, they are still not fully proven systems. Several problems relating to the proposed schemes, such as the key generation and key management problems, still remain unsolved. Furthermore, there may exist other good techniques to realize the SECC concept. These indeed require further research.
